! Newest hardware model/revision this flaw was checked for
+
! Timeframe this was discovered
+
! Discovered by
+
|-
+
| Incorrect padding check
+
| The FIRM signature is using PKCS #1 padding, which mandates that the padding is all 0xFF bytes. This is not checked correctly, because it only checks whether none of the bytes in the padding are 0x00. This allows a signature to be crafted more easily (sighax)
+
| N/A
+
| New3DS
+
| Summer 2015
+
| derrek and/or nedwill
+
|-
+
| No bound checks inside of ASN.1 parser
+
| The hash inside of the signature is stored in an ASN.1 structure. However the length fields are not bounds-checked, allowing one to point the header hash to the hash the 3DS calculated before verification. This and because of the aforementioned bug, you can brute-force a signature that will always work easily, as essentially only a few bytes need to be valid.