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! Newest hardware model/revision this flaw was checked for
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! Timeframe this was discovered
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! Discovered by
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|-
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| Incorrect padding check
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| The FIRM signature is using PKCS #1 padding, which mandates that the padding is all 0xFF bytes. This is not checked correctly, because it only checks whether none of the bytes in the padding are 0x00. This allows a signature to be crafted more easily (sighax)
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| N/A
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| New3DS
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| Summer 2015
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| derrek and/or nedwill
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|-
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| No bound checks inside of ASN.1 parser
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| The hash inside of the signature is stored in an ASN.1 structure. However the length fields are not bounds-checked, allowing one to point the header hash to the hash the 3DS calculated before verification. This and because of the aforementioned bug, you can brute-force a signature that will always work easily, as essentially only a few bytes need to be valid.